

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 09342 01 OF 05 081231Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02
SS-15 L-03 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00
EB-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00 USIA-06 AID-05 EPG-02 STR-04
CEA-01 FEAE-00 COME-00 ACDA-07 /106 W
-----081407Z 113888 /53

R 081219Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4754
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 09342

USEEC ALSO FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR US UK XF
SUBJECT: BRITISH POLICY ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

REF: (A) 76 LONDON 2253, (B) 76 LONDON A-66
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 09342 01 OF 05 081231Z

SUMMARY: BRITISH POLICY ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE IS
GOVERNED BY TWO PRINCIPAL, OFTEN OPPOSING, GROUPS OF
PRESSURES: ON THE ONE HAND, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE FOR
BRITAIN OF THE ARAB WORLD, AND BRITAIN'S PARTICIPATION
IN THE INCREASINGLY PRO-ARAB JOINT POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY; AND ON THE OTHER HAND, BRITAIN'S CLOSE ASSO-

CIATION WITH ANDDEPENDENCE ON THE US (WHICH HAS A DIFFERENT POLICY PERSPECTIVE), AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE UK OF ISRAEL'S SUPPORTERS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MUST STEER BETWEEN THESE CONFLICTING PRESSURES. ONE WAY IT TRIES TO DO THIS IS BY SERVING AS A "BRIDGE" BETWEEN THE EC AND THE US ON THE ISSUE; HOWEVER, THE BRITISH FEEL THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS THEY MUST GO ALONG WITH EC "LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR" POLICY STATEMENTS. IN UNILATERAL POLICY STATEMENTS, THE BRITISH TEND TO STRADDLE ON THE ISSUE, AS IN THEIR POSITIONS ON THE PALESTINIANS. DESPITE THE BRITISH COMMITMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM, THEY FEEL THEIR ABILITY TO ACT IS LIMITED, AND THEIR PUBLIC IMAGE ON THIS ISSUE IS ONE OF RETICENCE AND ABSTENTIONS. TO THE DEGREE THAT WE WISH TO USE THEM AS A BRIDGE TO THE EC ON THIS ISSUE, WE MUST SUPPLY THEM WITH DETAILED RATIONALES FOR OUR POLICY POSITIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. INTRODUCTION. BRITISH POLICY ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE IS BASED TO A LARGE DEGREE ON BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB WORLD. THESE ARE PRIMARILY ECONOMIC INTERESTS BASED ON BRITISH PETROLEUM REQUIREMENTS AND TRADITIONAL MARKETS FOR BRITISH EXPORTS DATING BACK TO BRITISH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HEGEMONY IN MOST OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IN 1976, ACCORDING TO IMF STATISTICS, BRITISH EXPORTS TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES (EXCLUDING THE VERY REMUNERATIVE SERVICES CONTRACTS) TOTALED THE EQUIVALENT OF \$3 BILLION 662 MILLION. AS WE NOTED IN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 09342 01 OF 05 081231Z

76 LONDON 2253, THE MARKET IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT IS STILL EXPANDING. ONE ADDITIONAL FACTOR IN THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE ARAB STATES HERE IS THEIR CONTINUED LONG-TERM INVESTMENT IN THE UK. WHILE BRITAIN HAS TRADITIONALLY DEPENDED ON THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST FOR A LARGE PROPORTION OF ITS PETROLEUM IMPORTS, BRITISH PRODUCTION OF NORTH SEA OIL HAS MOVED THE UK TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN OIL BY 1980, A SITUATION WHICH SHOULD ENDURE FOR ONE OR TWO DECADES. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, THE BRITISH ECONOMY HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY INTERTWINED WITH THOSE OF ITS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PARTNERS. THE ECONOMIES OF THE LATTER REMAIN DEPENDENT ON ARAB OIL IMPORTS, AND HAVE A HEAVY STAKE IN THE ARAB EXPORT MARKET.

2. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BRITISH POLICY ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE IS GOVERNED BY TWO PRINCIPAL, OFTEN OPPOSING, GROUPS OF PRESSURES: ON THE ONE HAND, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE FOR BRITAIN OF THE ARAB WORLD, AND BRITAIN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE INCREASINGLY PRO-ARAB JOINT POLICY

OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY; AND ON THE OTHER HAND,
BRITAIN'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH AND DEPENDENCE ON THE
UNITED STATES (WHICH, PARTICULARLY AS A MEDIATOR IS APT
TO HAVE A DIFFERENT POLICY PERSPECTIVE ON THE ISSUE) AND
THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE UK OF ISRAEL'S
SUPPORTERS. (THE LATTER INFLUENCE IN PARTICULAR IS OF
COURSE NEARLY ALWAYS OPPOSED TO UK PROPITIATION OF ARAB
MILITANCY.) THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEM IS HOW TO

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 09342 02 OF 05 090257Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02
SS-15 L-03 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00
EB-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00 USIA-06 AID-05 EPG-02 STR-04
CEA-01 FEA-01 COME-00 ACDA-07 /107 W
-----090301Z 125509 /62/53

R 081219Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4755
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 09342

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT GARBLED THROUGHOUT)

USEEC ALSO FOR E

STEER ITS POLICY BETWEEN ALL THESE CONFLICTING PRESSURES.

3. PRO-ARAB PRESSURES AND INFLUENCES. THE EFFECT OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 09342 02 OF 05 090257Z

ARAB ECONOMIC POWER ON BRITISH POLICY IS MORE IMPLICIT THAN EXPLICIT. THE OVERTLY PRO-ARAB LOBBY OPERATED BY PROMINENT BRITISH ARABOPHILES IS NOT VERY EFFECTIVE OR INFLUENTIAL. WHAT IS EFFECTIVE FROM THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW IS THE MEMORY OF THE ARAB OIL CUTBACKS IN 1973 AND THE INGRAINED CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH ESTABLISHMENT AND BODY POLITIC OF THE ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF ANTAGONIZING THE ARABS. THIS CONSCIOUSNESS IS REFLECTED IN SPEECHES BY BOTH LEADING PARTIES ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS (REF AIRGRAMS). THE BRITISH ESTABLISHMENT IS WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A RECURRENCE OF AN ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND AN ARAB OIL BOYCOTT AND THEREFORE WISHES TO KEEP THE ARABS FROM BECOMING ANGRY NOT ONLY AT THE BRITISH, BUT AT ANY INFLUENTIAL PART OF THE WEST, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. THE BRITISH SEE DANGER THAT THE USG MIGHT PROVOKE THE ARABS BY STRIKING A BALANCE WEIGHTED TOO FAR ON THE ISRAELI SIDE, AND THE BRITISH WOULD THEN FEEL IMPELLED TO TRY TO CORRECT THE BALANCE. WITHIN THE FCO, THIS SITUATION REINFORCES AN INGRAINED DISPOSITION AMONG FCO OFFICERS WHO CONSIDER MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES TO BE AN IMPERATIVE BRITISH NATIONAL INTEREST.

4. MEANWHILE, AS MASSIVE WAVES OF ARAB TOURISTS (NOT IN THEMSELVES VERY POPULAR) CONTINUE TO POUR INTO BRITAIN, WE CAN EXPECT ARAB MONEY TO MAKE A PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON MERCHANTS, AND TO MAKE ITSELF INCREASINGLY FELT IN THE MEDIA. ARAB MONEY CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED TO BACK SOPHISTICATED PUBLICATIONS IN THE UK WHICH WILL PROJECT THE ARAB CAUSE MORE EFFECTIVELY. THESE INFLUENCES ARE SOMEWHAT INTANGIBLE BUT CONTRIBUTE TO THE GENERAL HIGH VISIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC STAKE IN THE ARAB WORLD.

5. ASIDE FROM THEIR OWN PRIMARY NATIONAL INTERESTS IN IMPLEMENTING FOREIGN POLICY ON MAJOR ISSUES, THE BRITISH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 09342 02 OF 05 090257Z

NOW MUST CONSIDER THEIR ROLE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

IN ADDITION TO UNILATERAL POLICY STATEMENTS, BRITISH POLICY IS ENUNCIATED IN THE JOINT FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENTS OF THE EC. THIS SYSTEM PROVIDES A CONVENIENT FRAMEWORK, IDEOLOGICALLY AND OTHERWISE. THE RISING GENERATION OF OFFICERS IN THE FCO, WHICH SEES BRITAIN'S FUTURE (AND THEIR OWN) PREDOMINANTLY IN EUROPE, THINKS AND ACTS INCREASINGLY IN EUROPEAN TERMS. DURING THE LAST TWO FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS (REFAIRS) A PRINCIPAL ALBEIT GENERALIZED THEME OF SPEAKERS FROM BOTH MAJOR PARTIES WAS THAT THE EC, WITH BRITAIN LEADING THE WAY, SHOULD ASSUME MORE OF A ROLE IN INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT. WHILE MAINTAINING THEIR SOVEREIGNTY WHEN THEY FEEL THEIR VITAL INTERESTS REQUIRE IT, THE BRITISH HAVE TRIED TO HARMONIZE AS MANY OF THEIR DIPLOMATIC POSITIONS AS FEASIBLE WITH THE EC, AND FIND THAT FORUM A USEFUL ONE FOR ADDRESSING AND PROPITIATING THE ARABS.

6. OPPOSING ANTI-ARAB AND NON-ARAB PRESSURES:
(A BRITISH ZIONISM. AGAINST THESE PRESSURES FOR SUPPORT OF THE ARAB CAUSE, THE INCREASINGLY DEFENSIVE GROUP OF ISRAEL'S SUPPORTERS IN BRITAIN STANDS IN THE POLITICAL FRONT LINE. THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE WELL ORCHESTRATED AND ARTICULATE; HOWEVER, A STRAW IN THE WIND IS THE FACT THAT THEY ARE FACING VOCIFEROUS POLITICAL HOSTILITY FROM PRO-ARAB GROUPS ON SEVERAL BRITISH UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES. THE MAIN PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTH OF THE SUPPORTERS OF ISRAEL IS IN THE LABOR PARTY, WHICH HAS SENTIMENTAL LINKS WITH THE ISRAELI LABOR PARTY IN PARTICULAR. (THESE LINKS ARE NOT WITH THE LIKUD, AND BEGIN'S VICTORY MAY REDUCE SUPPORT FOR THE GOI IN BRITAIN--SEE LONDON 8424). ISRAEL LOST AN IMPORTANT CHAMPION IN POWER LAST YEAR WITH THE RETIREMENT OF HAROLD WILSON, WHO DEEPLY DISTRUSTED THE ADVICE OF THE MIDDLE EAST SPECIALISTS IN THE FCO. THIS LOSS MAY HAVE BEEN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LONDON 09342 02 OF 05 090257Z

PARTLY OFFSET BY THE APPOINTMENT AS FOREIGN SECRETARY OF DAVID OWEN WHO IS CONSIDERED FRIENDLY TO ISRAEL BY THAT COUNTRY'S SUPPORTERS HERE. IN THE CONSERVATIVE RANKS, THE PRO-ZIONISTS RETAIN THE SUPPORT OF MRS. THATCHER, WHOSE RECENTLY APPOINTED SHADOW FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS SO FAR AVOIDED HIS PREDECESSOR'S PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (REF AIRGRAMS). NEVERTHELESS, BOTH PARTIES CONTAIN OUTSPOKEN PRO-ARAB SYMPATHIZERS WHO CHALLENGE THE ZIONIST LINE. WHILE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 09342 03 OF 05 081252Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02
SS-15 L-03 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00
EB-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00 USIA-06 AID-05 EPG-02 STR-04
CEA-01 FEAE-00 COME-00 ACDA-07 /106 W
-----081407Z 114136 /53

R 081219Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4756
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 LONDON 09342

USEEC ALSO FOR E

POLITICAL LEADERS IN BRITAIN STILL SEEK TO AVOID UNNE-
CESSARILY ANTAGONIZING PRO-ZIONIST VOTERS, IN A CRUNCH
THE THREAT OF ARAB-INDUCED OVERALL ECONOMIC CATASTROPHE
WOULD SUPERSEDE THAT CONSIDERATION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 09342 03 OF 05 081252Z

7. (B) US INFLUENCE. A FAR MORE IMPORTANT COUNTER-

PRESSURE TO ANY BRITISH INCLINATION TO SUCCUMB TO ARAB DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE IS THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH CHERISH, AND ARE TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE DEPENDENT UPON, THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US WHICH HAS JUST BEEN REAFFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN. THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY IN STATEMENTS TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS MAKES A POINT OF STRESSING CONTINUING CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE US ON MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. THE BRITISH ARE FULLY AWARE OF THEIR STRATEGIC DEPENDENCE ON US AND OF THE ESSENTIAL ROLE THE US PLAYED RECENTLY IN SHORING UP THE BRITISH ECONOMY. WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, THE BRITISH RECOGNIZE THAT ONLY AMERICAN MEDIATION CAN WORK OUT A SOLUTION WHICH, BY PREVENTING ANOTHER DESTRUCTIVE MILITARY EXPLOSION IN THE AREA, WOULD SAFEGUARD BRITAIN'S VITAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE BRITISH THEREFORE TRY TO AVOID ANTAGONIZING THE US BY TAKING ANY DIPLOMATIC MOVE WHICH THE US FEELS WOULD CUT ACROSS US MEDIATING EFFORTS.

8. BRITISH POLICY AS MANIFESTED IN EC. FACED WITH THESE VARIOUS PRESSURES, THE BRITISH ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN A DELICATE BALANCE ON THE ISSUE. ONE WAY THEY TRY TO DO THIS IS BY UNDERTAKING TO SERVE, ON THE BASIS OF PARTICULAR BRITISH EXPERTISE, AS THE "BRIDGE" OR MIDDLE-MAN BETWEEN THE EC AND THE US ON ARAB-ISRAELI POLICY MATTERS, EXPLAINING THE POSITION OF EACH TO THE OTHER. THIS PROCESS CAN PLACE THE BRITISH IN AN OSTENSIBLY AWKWARD POSITION WHEN THE US AND BRITAIN'S EC PARTNERS DIFFER ON A COURSE OF ACTION REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST, SUCH AS EC PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENTS. SEVERAL OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EC HAVE LESS EFFECTIVE PRO-ISRAELI PRESSURES AFFECTING THEIR POLITICAL STRUCTURES, AND HENCE TEND TO FORMULATE AND PROPOSE FOREIGN POLICY UTTERANCES AND ACTIONS PRINCIPALLY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ECONOMIC

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 09342 03 OF 05 081252Z

INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. WHEN THE OTHER EC MEMBERS COLLECTIVELY AGREE TO TAKE A POLICY POSITION ON AN ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE, INFLUENCED BY THESE INTERESTS, THE BRITISH TELL US THAT THERE IS GREAT PRESSURE ON THEM TO GO ALONG WITH THE EC "LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR" RATHER THAN BE SUBJECTED TO FRENCH TAUNTS THAT BRITAIN IS THE "AMERICAN TROJAN HORSE" IN THE EC. NO DOUBT THE BRITISH HAVE THEIR OWN REASONS, BASED ON THE SAME ECONOMIC IMPULSIONS AS THEIR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, FOR FEELING THEY HAVE TO GO ALONG, DESPITE AN ADVERSE AMERICAN REACTION. HENCE WE HAVE BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN EC STATEMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE, SUCH AS THE NOVEMBER 1973 PUBLIC DECLARATION AND THE LEAKED JANUARY 1977 DRAFT STATEMENT,

WHICH THE US DID NOT WISH THE EC TO MAKE PUBLIC AT THE TIME.

9. BRITISH UNILATERAL POLICY. IN THE SPHERE OF BRITISH UNILATERAL DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS, THE BRITISH TEND TO "STRADDLE" ON THE ISSUE. BRITISH POLICY ON THE PALESTINIANS PROVIDES A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF THE BRITISH STRADDLING POSTURE. ON THE ONE HAND, THE BRITISH HAVE AVOIDED GIVING THE PLO THE DEGREE OF RECOGNITION THAT SOME OTHER WESTERN EUROPEANS HAVE (ALTHOUGH BRITISH OFFICIALS UNLIKE USG DO MAINTAIN INFORMAL DIRECT CONTACT WITH PLO REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON AND IN ARAB COUNTRIES). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE BRITISH DELIVERED A STATEMENT IN THE UNGA LAST OCTOBER CALLING FOR A "LAND FOR THE PALESTINIANS (76 LONDON 16139). AT THE SAME TIME, THE FCO INFORMED US THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE STATEMENT WAS TO KEEP THE BRITISH FROM APPEARING TO BE THE LEAST FORTHCOMING OF THE EC PARTNERS ON THE ISSUE, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT IS OF SUCH EMOTIONAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ARABS.

10. FCO OFFICERS TELL US THEY FEEL THAT IT HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT FOR SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICERS, ACCUS-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LONDON 09342 03 OF 05 081252Z

TOMED FOR OVER A GENERATION TO DEALING WITH THE BRITISH ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS ON A PURELY BILATERAL BASIS, TO ACHIEVE FULL AWARENESS OF THE EVOLUTION IN BRITISH POLICY RESULTING FROM MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC. FCO OFFICERS WHO HAVE VISITED WASHINGTON RECENTLY HAVE COMMENTED TO US (JUSTIFIABLY OR NOT) THAT THEY OBTAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT US OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON DID NOT APPRECIATE THE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 09342 04 OF 05 081255Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02
SS-15 L-03 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00

EB-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00 USIA-06 AID-05 EPG-02 STR-04

CEA-01 FEAE-00 COME-00 ACDA-07 /106 W

-----081406Z 114170 /53

R 081219Z JUN 77

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4757

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 LONDON 09342

USEEC ALSO FOR E

"DEGREE OF CONSTRAINTS" IMPOSED ON BRITISH MIDDLE EAST
POLICY BY THE UK'S EC TIES. THERE IS SOMETHING TO THIS
ALTHOUGH AS WE HAVE SUGGESTED, THE BRITISH ARE FULLY
CAPABLE OF HIDING BEHIND COMMUNITY SKIRTS ON EC ISSUES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 09342 04 OF 05 081255Z

11. ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
FOR BRITISH POLICY. A FINAL, MUCH BROADER, SET OF
IMPULSIONS AND COUNTER-IMPULSIONS AFFECTING BRITISH
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM DESERVING OF
MENTION IS THE STRENGTH OF BRITAIN'S COMMITMENT TO THE
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. THE BRITISH HAVE
AN INBRED SENSE OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE
OF WORLD PEACE AND ORDER, AND AN INTELLECTUAL
COMMITMENT TO THE POST-WAR GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM WHICH THEY
HELPED CREATE. AS AGAINST THIS
TRADITIONAL COMMITMENT, THERE IS A FEELING THAT AS A
NATION WITH GRAVE UNSOLVED ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BRITAIN NO
LONGER HAS THE CAPACITY TO HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON THE SOLUTION
OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN ARENA.
THIS FEELING IS MATCHED BY A DECLINE IN THE ABILITY OR

WILL TO UNDERTAKE MAJOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. BRITAIN'S FOREIGN SERVICE IS UNDERSTANDABLY BEING PRESSURED TO CONVERT A GREATER PROPORTION OF ITS WORK AND PERSONNEL TO THE PROMOTION OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AND EXPORTS. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE SYNDROME OF THE WITHDRAWAL FROM "EAST OF SUEZ" HAS BEEN MATCHED BY AN ABSENCE OF ACTIVISM IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS EXCEPT IN THE DIRECT PROMOTION OF BRITISH ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

12. PUBLIC IMAGE OF BRITISH POLICY: RETICENCE AND ABSTENTION. THE RESULT OF THE FOREGOING IS THAT IN PRACTICE THE PUBLIC IMAGE BRITAIN PRESENTS TO THE WORLD IS INCREASINGLY A POLICY OF "RETICENCE" WITH REGARD TO THE ARAB/ISRAELI SITUATION. ALTHOUGH THE ARABS LED BY THE EGYPTIANS HAVE PRESSED THE BRITISH TO SPEAK OUT MORE ON THIS SUBJECT SO AS TO HELP MAINTAIN "MOMENTUM" TOWARDS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, THE BRITISH HAVE RESISTED BEING DRAWN OUT. IN RECENT UN VOTES, THEY HAVE SOUGHT TO AVOID RECRIMINATION ON THE PART OF THE ARABS, THE US, OR THE ISRAELIS BY ABSTAINING, OFTEN IN COMPANY WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EC. WHILE THE BRITISH ASPIRED TO THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 09342 04 OF 05 081255Z

ROLE OF "THE GREAT COMPROMISERS" IN THIS ISSUE IN THE 1960S IN THE UN, IN THE 1970S THEY GIVE THE APPEARANCE OFTEN OF BECOMING "THE GREAT ABSTAINERS".

13. UK POLICY PLANNING ASPECTS. IN THEIR INTERNAL POLICY PLANNING THE BRITISH HAVE RECENTLY BEEN DEVOTING A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF EFFORT TO STUDYING THE MECHANICS OF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS GUARANTEES, ELECTRONIC SENSORS, AND DEMILITARIZED ZONES (LONDON 6463). HOWEVER, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE FCO IS COMING UP WITH ANY COMPREHENSIVE BLUEPRINTS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE BRITISH AT PRESENT APPEAR TO BE CONTENT TO FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE US, THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED MEDIATOR, WITH THE QUALIFICATIONS THAT THEY WISH 1) TO CONTINUE TO IMPRESS ON THE USG THE IMPERATIVE NEED FOR EARLY ACTION TO ACHIEVE A PEACE SETTLEMENT AND 2) TO OCCASIONALLY JOIN IN MAKING EC POLICY STATEMENTS ON THE ISSUE WHICH WILL GO AT LEAST PART OF THE WAY TOWARD SATISFYING ARAB POLITICAL DEMANDS AS STRIDENTLY SET FORTH BY SOME ARABS IN THE LAST MEETING OF THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 09342 05 OF 05 081255Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02
SS-15 L-03 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00
EB-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00 USIA-06 AID-05 EPG-02 STR-04
CEA-01 FEAE-00 COME-00 ACDA-07 /106 W
-----081406Z 114177 /53

R 081219Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4758
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 LONDON 09342

USEEC ALSO FOR E

14. COMMENT. THERE IS SOME QUESTION IN OUR MINDS AS TO
WHETHER IT IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE US OR THE
BRITISH TO HAVE THEM CONTINUALLY SERVE AS A "BRIDGE"
BETWEEN US AND THE EC ON THIS ISSUE. THEY ARE, AFTER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 09342 05 OF 05 081255Z

ALL, SUSPECT IN PARIS. BUT IF WE DO WISH TO CONTINUE TO
EXPLOIT THEIR OFFER, WE SHOULD DO SO BY EXPLAINING OUR
POSITIONS TO THEM MORE FULLY. WE MAY STILL WISH TO

DISSUADE THE EC FROM ISSUING UNTIMELY OR CONTENTIOUSLY
WORDED DECLARATIONS, OR TAKING SOME OTHER COURSE OF
ACTION OF WHICH WE DISAPPROVE REGARDING THE ARAB-ISRAELI
DISPUTE. A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE IS THE PROPOSAL FOR ANOTHER
EC POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE, WHICH
SOME EC MEMBERS MAY WANT TO TRY ON AGAIN THIS SUMMER.
IF THEY DO TRY AND WE HAVE SOME OBJECTIONS, RATHER THAN
MERELY TELLING THE EC NINE THAT THE PROPOSED COURSE OF
ACTION WOULD BE UNTIMELY OR CONTENTIOUS, AND CONVEYING
THE IMPRESSION OF ARM TWISTING, WE SHOULD PROVIDE THE
BELGIAN PRESIDENCY, THE BRITISH AND THE GERMANS WITH A
MORE DETAILED SCENARIO OF THE EFFECT OF SUCH A STATEMENT,
IFYING THE MEASURABLE DAMAGES TO THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF US MEDIATING POSITION OR TO OTHER WESTERN INTERESTS
THAT WOULD OCCUR IF IT WERE ISSUED.

BREWSTER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, PETROLEUM, EXPORTS, POLICIES, FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 08-Jun-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977LONDON09342
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770204-0368
Format: TEL
From: LONDON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770679/aaaacrbt.tel
Line Count: 619
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: b98da182-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 LONDON 2253, 76 LONDON A-66
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2231919
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BRITISH POLICY ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
TAGS: PFOR, US, UK, XF
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/b98da182-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009